[aprssig] Universal APRS messaging
Heikki Hannikainen
hessu at hes.iki.fi
Fri Oct 24 03:20:04 EDT 2008
On Thu, 23 Oct 2008, Tyler Allison wrote:
> Steve Dimse wrote:
>> We'll have to agree to disagree on this. I think providing any
>> illusion that there is security is wrong. IGate operators need to know
>> they bear total responsibility for everything transmitted through
>> their IGate. Authenticating web access give the illusion of security
>> which does not exist.
>
> No we don't. I agree with you on a philosophical stand point :)
>
> What I meant is that if someone is bound and determined to implement
> something the only real thing I've heard that might stop some random acts
> of annoyance is the web access authentication. But it should not be
> cloaked in the guise of removing liability. It's stopping ankle biters,
> which are not the real liability risk.
I have to agree with Tyler on the practical side of things. I know of a
few ways to break into my apartment without much trouble, but I still want
to keep the front door locked so that anyone can't simply walk in. And
yes, I know that the front door can be picked too.
If there is a security hole on one side of a production system, we
shouldn't create more of them on the other side to just prove the point. I
think we should work to plug the existing holes instead of creating more
of them.
On the philosophical side, I do enjoy reading the bugtraq mailing list and
see the value of releasing proof-of-concept code to force big companies to
fix their security holes, if they're not willing to do so otherwise. As
long as they're not publishing holes in *my* systems, it's fine. :)
And while there isn't security on APRS-IS, I wouldn't actually mind
improving security on the web interfaces. It'll be useful when/if the
security on APRS-ISv2 (or whatever) is implemented. OpenID would be nice
for mutual sharing of verified license status information, I suggested it
in the spring:
http://oh7lzb.blogspot.com/2008/05/how-to-authenticate-licensed-hams.html
It simply does not work for the APRS-IS case, though. RSA/DSA signatures
by igates for every gated message, anyone? :)
(Seriously speaking, the CA mess would be a maintenance nightmare in such
a decentralized system, and the CPU requirements would be noticeable. I
doubt people would bother.)
- Hessu, OH7LZB (aprs.fi)
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